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§1. Introduction
Lewis’s	 two	Gods	knew	exactly	which	world	 they	were	 in,	but	 they	
didn’t	 know	 everything.1	 Neither	 God	 knew	 which God they were, 
truths	they	would	have	canonically	expressed	using	words	like	 ‘I’	or	
‘me’.	We’re	lucky;	we	aren’t	like	Lewis’s	Gods.	We	do	know	things	we	
canonically	 express	 using	 first-person	 pronouns.	 The	 advantage	we	
have	over	Lewis’s	two	Gods	is	one	way	of	capturing	what	is	at	issue	
in	the	debate	around	the	so-called	essential indexical thesis,	the	thesis	
that	indexical	attitudes	have	an	irreducible	role	in	intentional	action	
explanations.
Imagine	now	a	third	God,	omniscient	and	a	competent	first-person	
thinker	but	for	the	following	limitation:	she	is	unable	to	think	of	her-
self,	thought	of	first-personally,	as	identical	to	anything	encountered	
under	a	non-first-personal	way	of	thinking.	As	with	Lewis’s	Gods,	this	
impairment	(as	well	as	her	omniscience)	sets	her	apart	from	us.	Not	
only	do	thinkers	like	us	know	things	about	ourselves	canonically	ex-
pressible	using	words	 like	 ‘I’	and	 ‘me’,	but,	 to	our	 further	advantage,	
we	also	know	things	about	ourselves	we	canonically	express	non-first-
personally	—	by	the	use	of	descriptions,	for	instance,	or	demonstrative	
expressions.	We	typically	have	no	trouble	slipping	between	these	dis-
tinct	 forms	of	 self-directed	 thought	with	minimal	effort	or	attention,	
an	ability	anchored	in	our	recognition	of	what	it	is	for	an	identity	be-
tween	their	referents	to	be	true.	
Recently	 there	 has	 been	 growing	 resistance	 to	 the	 essential	 in-
dexical	 thesis,	previously	considered	orthodoxy.2	This	paper	doesn’t	
join	 that	 resistance,	 but	 I	 do	 think	 that	 our	 preoccupation	with	 the	
essential	indexical	thesis	has	led	to	neglect	of	the	importance	of	our	
non-indexical	ways	of	thinking	of	ourselves	for	our	agency.	That	is	the	
focus	 of	 this	 paper.	Of	 course,	 thinking	 of	 oneself	 as	 identical	with	
the	 referent	 of	 a	 non-indexical	 concept	 is	 precisely	what	God	num-
ber	 three	can’t	do	—	so,	with	 this	 third	God	 in	view,	 the	question	of	
this	paper	becomes:	what	advantage	do	we	have	as	agents	over	God	
1.	Lewis (1979), p. 520
2.	See, e.g., Cappelen and Dever (2013), Magidor (2015) 
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rule	that	any	token	use	of	the	concept	refers	to	its	user.	This	rule	states	
the	conditions	under	which	 someone	counts	as	 the	 referent	of	 a	 to-
ken	use	of	the	concept;	it	does	not	provide	descriptive	content	that	a	
thinker	must	entertain	in	thinking	a	first-person	thought.	Any	concept	
whose	reference	ascriptions	are	governed	by	this	rule	of	token-reflex-
ive	 reference	 is	 a	first-person	 concept	 (I).	Any	 concept	whose	 refer-
ence	ascriptions	are	not	governed	by	this	rule	is	not	(δ).3 
Both	the	limitation	described	in	(i)	and	the	powers	ascribed	to	her	
in	(ii)	will	make	God	number	three’s	psychology	unlike	ours	in	various	
ways.	One	worry	here	might	be	that	her	minimal	description	makes	it	
hard	to	say	exactly	what	happens	to	God	number	three,	psychologically	
speaking,	when	she	attempts	thoughts	of	the	form	⌜I = δ⌝	—	and	that	
this	risks	derailing	her	usefulness	as	a	thought	experiment.	After	all,	
so	long	as	she	has	the	concept	I,	the	concept	δ, the	concept	of	identity,	
and	the	conceptual	capacity	for	concatenation,	then	perhaps	(the	wor-
ry	goes)	this	suffices	to	secure	her	capacity	to	entertain	thoughts	of	the	
form	⌜I = δ⌝.	So	what	exactly	goes	wrong	when	she	attempts	to	think	
them?	Luckily,	there	are	plenty	of	more	familiar	cases	that	will	help	to	
make	God	number	three’s	psychology	seem	somewhat	less	incredible.	
For	example:	I	have	full	mastery	of	the	concepts	Caesar, prime number 
and	is,	and	the	conceptual	capacity	for	concatenation,	but	Caesar is a 
prime number	 is	 plausibly	not	 a	 string	 that	 I	 can	meaningfully	 enter-
tain	—	at	least,	not	in	the	same	way	that	I	can	entertain	intra-categorial	
strings.	Of	 course,	 the	explanation	of	my	difficulties	 in	 entertaining	
this	string will	clearly	be	different	from	the	stipulative	explanation	of	
God	number	three’s	difficulties	in	entertaining	thoughts	of	the	form	⌜I 
= δ⌝.	This	isn’t	important:	the	important	point	is	that	this	comparison	
gives	us	a	way	of	understanding	what	happens	to	God	number	three	
when	she	attempts	these	thoughts.	Psychologically	speaking,	let’s	say	
that	God	number	 three’s	attempts	 to	entertain	⌜I = δ⌝	 thoughts	are	
3.	 This framework excludes those who either don’t think the first-person concept refers 
(e.g. Anscombe 1975) or think it gets its reference in some way other than by the token-
reflexive rule (e.g. Evans 1982); I take these to be minority views among contemporary 
philosophers of  mind, but see Morgan (2015) for an exception. 
number	three?	My	answer	is	going	to	be	that	thinkers	like	her	would	
be	excluded	from	participation	in	some	of	the	domains	of	agency	we	
value	most	as	part	of	a	full	human	life	—	viz.,	domains	of	agency	associ-
ated	with	our	social	identities.	
It	will	be	useful	to	have	God	number	three’s	details	up	front.	Let	I 
be	a	first-person	concept,	and	δ	be	an	arbitrary	concept	other	than	a	
first-person	concept.	God	number	 three	 is	a	 thinker	defined	by	 two	
conditions:	
(i)	She	cannot	entertain	identities	of	the	form	⌜I = δ⌝;	and	
(ii)	 she	 is	 otherwise	 omniscient	 and	 conceptually	
unlimited.	
God	number	three	shouldn’t	be	conflated	with	another	possible	think-
er	—	God	 number	 four	—	who	 cannot	 think	 of	 what	 is	 in	 fact	 them-
selves	under	a	non-first-personal	(or,	equivalently	as	 I	am	using	the	
term,	non-indexical)	concept.	God	number	four	plays	no	part	 in	the	
arguments	to	come.
Some	points	of	further	clarification	about	God	number	three.	Since	
the	question	that	ultimately	interests	us	is	one	about	the	significance	
of	 certain	 conceptual	 capacities	 of	 ours	—	that	 is,	 the	 conceptual	 ca-
pacity	 to	 recognise	 oneself,	 thought	 of	 first-personally,	 as	 identical	
to	 something	 thought	 of	 non-first-personally	—	the	 limitation	 in	 (i)	
should	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 a	 stipulated	 conceptual	 deficiency	 on	God	
number	three’s	part,	rather	than	(say)	a	glitch	in	her	neural	hardware.	
Since	we	don’t	want	the	downstream	deficiencies	we	end	up	finding	
to	be	effects	of	any	other	limitations	than	this,	make	her	omniscience	
in	 (ii)	 as	 fine-grained	 as	 you	 like.	 If	 knowing	 that	Hesperus is bright 
and	knowing	that	Phosphorus is bright	is	knowing	two	things,	then	she	
knows	them	both.	By	‘otherwise’	in	(ii),	I	mean	other	than	limitations	
stipulated	or	implied	by	(i).
By	concept,	I	mean	a	hyperintensional	constituent	of	thought,	indi-
viduated	by	its	reference	rule	or	the	way	it	gets	to	have	the	reference	
that	it	has.	The	first-person	concept	is	individuated	by	the	reference	
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IEM	 is	 a	 modal	 property	 had	 by	 some	 judgment-grounds	 pairs.	
There	is	ongoing	disagreement	about	how	best	to	formulate	it,	but	the	
following	will	do	for	our	purposes:
IEM.	A	judgment,	a is F,	made	on	grounds	g,	is	IEM	rela-
tive	 to	a	 iff	 the	 following	mistake	 is	not	possible:	g	pro-
vides	 proper	 grounds	 for	 knowledge	 that	 something is 
F,	but	the	judgment	is	in	error	only	because	the	subject	
has	mistakenly	identified	a	as	the	thing	that	she	thereby	
knows	to	be	F.5 
There	 is	 yet	 more	 ongoing	 disagreement	 about	 which	 grounds	 get	
to	 count	 as	 issuing	 in	first-person	 judgments	with	 this	 property.	Al-
most	everyone	agrees	on	 introspection,	but	 the	rest	 is	controversial.	
Other	popular	 candidates	 in	 the	 literature	 include	proprioception	 (I 
have crossed legs)	and	the	distinctive	way	we	have	of	knowing	about	
our	own	actions	 in	virtue	of	being	their	agent	(I am peeling a potato).	
Gareth	Evans	adds	 to	 this	 list	our	 faculty	of	perceptual	 self-location	
(I am in front of a burning tree)	and,	along	with	others	after	him,	argued	
that	episodic	memory	serves	to	preserve	the	IEM	of	first-person	judg-
ments	into	their	past-tensed	analogues	(I was on a ship).	Others	have	
argued	 against	 the	 inclusion	of	 one	or	more	of	 these	 grounds.6	We	
5.	 This formulation is largely taken from Shoemaker (1969) pp. 556–7, with his talk of  ‘state-
ments’ updated to talk of  ‘judgments’ to make it applicable to the mental realm, and with 
the standard addition (since Evans 1982) of  relativisation to grounds. It approximates the 
which-object side of  Pryor (1999)’s which-object / de re divide, but since this is the stronger 
category of  the two, nothing hangs on putting things this way. By ‘grounds’ I mean to in-
clude both explicit inferences leading to the formation of  the judgment, but also implicit 
presuppositional background (see Wright 2012 and Coliva 2006 for two theorists who 
think presuppositional structure should be included in assessments of  IEM). Even where 
I drop the relativisation for ease of  expression, I always mean IEM (and VEM) relative to 
a use of  the first-person concept. As I have formulated it, IEM captures the impossibility of  a 
certain kind of  false positive error pertaining to a first-person thought that has already in 
fact been formed on certain grounds, rather than the impossibility of  having grounds that 
lead improperly to the formation (or non-formation) of  corresponding singular judg-
ments; thanks to a reviewer for pressing me on this point, and see Salje (2016) for more 
on this distinction.
6.	 For examples of  discussions of  the claimed IEM of  proprioception, see, e.g., Evans 
(1982), Cassam (1997), Hamilton (2009), Peacocke (2008), Coliva (2012), Morgan (2012), 
broadly	comparable	to	what	it	is	like	for	us	when	we	attempt	to	enter-
tain	cross-categorial	strings	like	Caesar is a prime number.4	She	just	can’t	
make	out	what	it	would	take	for	the	thought	to	be	true.
The	aim	of	this	paper,	broadly	speaking,	 is	to	raise	a	case	for	the	
importance	of	our	non-indexical	ways	of	thinking	of	ourselves	for	our	
agentive	lives.	I	will	pursue	this	aim	by	considering	the	predicament	
of	God	number	three.	The	argumentative	strategy	comes	in	two	steps.	
First	I	will	establish	that	God	number	three’s	stipulated	limitation	in	
(i)	precludes	her	 from	properly	 forming	a	certain	range	of	I am F be-
liefs,	despite	her	omniscience	as	otherwise	given	in	(ii).	The	normative	
force	of	 ‘properly’	here	and	 throughout	 is	 that	of	epistemic	 justifica-
tion.	I	argue	for	this	first	step	in	§§2–3.	The	second	step	is	to	show	that	
this	restriction	to	her	properly	formed	I am F	beliefs	in	turn	restricts	
her	 agentive	 range	—	and	more	 specifically,	 that	 it	 limits	 her	 partici-
pation	in	the	domains	of	agency	associated	with	her	social	identity.	I	
argue	for	this	second	step	in	§4.	§5	concludes.	
§2. De jure absolute vulnerability to error through misidentification
The	first	step	in	the	argument	is	to	establish	the	claim	that	God	number	
three’s	stipulated	limitation	in	(i)	entails	that	some	properly	formed	I 
am F	beliefs	will	be	out	of	her	reach,	despite	the	fact	that	she	is	other-
wise	omniscient	and	conceptually	unlimited.	The	key	to	establishing	
this	claim	is	the	theoretical	notion	of	de jure absolute vulnerability to er-
ror through misidentification relative to a use of the first-person concept. The	
task	of	this	section	is	to	set	out	that	notion;	to	do	that,	we	will	need	
to	begin	with	the	more	familiar	notion	of	immunity to error through mis-
identification (IEM).	After	setting	out	these	key	notions	in	this	section,	
the	rest	of	the	argument	for	the	first	argumentative	step	comes	in	the	
next	section	(§3).
4.	 Note that there are parallel questions about how psychologically realistic Lewis’s two 
Gods are, if  we think that acting intentionally entails de se knowledge of  what one is do-
ing and if  we think that Lewis’s Gods are intentional actors (see O’Brien [1994] for the 
beginnings of  such an argument). This isn’t normally taken to undermine their usefulness 
in highlighting the significance of  our capacity for de se thought.
	 léa	salje The Essential Non-Indexical
philosophers’	imprint	 –		4		–	 vol.	19,	no.	20	(june	2019)
formed,	but	in all circumstances.	Shoemaker	thought	that	mental-state	
self-ascriptions	were	 like	this.	The	judgment	 I am bored,	 for	 instance,	
is	 IEM	 in	 all	 circumstances	 of	 formation,	 or	 so	 the	 idea	 goes.	 The	
main	reason	this	category	has	since	been	largely	rejected	is	that	it	al-
ways	 seems	 easy	 enough	 to	 cook	 up	 circumstances	 in	which	 a	 pos-
sibility	of	a	misidentification	error	 is	 introduced	into	the	judgment’s	
grounds.	Perhaps	I	visit	my	therapist,	who	assures	me	that	I	am	bored,	
and	—	trusting	her	judgment	—	I	come	to	form	the	corresponding	be-
lief	about	myself.	As	it	turns	out,	she’s	reading	from	the	wrong	client	
file.	While	 this	epistemic	 transaction	 is	a	good	way	of	knowing	 that	
someone is	bored,	the	judgment	is	in	error	solely	because	I	have	taken	
myself	to	be	the	proper	witness	to	the	warranted	existential	claim.	So	
although	 the	 judgment	 I am bored	 is	 typically IEM	 relative	 to	 its	use	
of	the	first-person	concept,	here	is	a	set	of	circumstances	in	which	it	
would	be	VEM	relative	to	its	use	of	the	first-person	concept.	So	much	
for	the	claim	that	all	mental-state	judgments	are	absolutely	IEM.	
Individual	 cases	 like	 this,	 together	with	 natural	 extrapolatory	 as-
sumptions,	 do	 enough	 to	 undermine	 Shoemaker’s	 category	 of	 abso-
lute	IEM.	However,	I	also	think	that	there	is	a	more	principled	reason	
to	reject	that	category	in	the	offing.	The	case	just	given	typifies	those	
normally	designed	 to	demonstrate	 the	point	 in	 its	 involvement	of	a	
faulty	testifier,	and	this	 is	no	accident.	That’s	because	testimony	is	a	
highly	 content-neutral	 epistemic	 source.	 This	 means	 that	 whatever	
the	property,	one	can	always	be	told	that	one	is	instantiating	it	—	and	
whenever	one	comes	to	self-ascribe	a	property	by	being	told	about	it,	
there	is	always	a	risk	of	an	error	through	misidentification	having	been	
introduced	somewhere	in	the	epistemic	grounds.	Testimony,	that	is	to	
say,	is	firmly	on	the	VEM	side	of	the	divide,	and	this	alone	suffices	to	
establish	that	Shoemaker’s	category	of	absolute	IEM	is	an	empty	one.
I	don’t	now	intend	to	defend	Shoemaker’s	category	of	absolute	IEM.	
I	do,	however,	think	he	was	right	about	something	—	there	is	space	for	
an	“absolute”	category	of	possibility	of	error	through	misidentification	
in	the	vicinity;	it’s	just	that	Shoemaker	was	looking	on	the	wrong	side	
of	the	divide.	There	aren’t	judgments	that	are	IEM	in	all	circumstances,	
needn’t	enter	into	these	ground-level	disagreements	here	—	important	
for	our	purposes	is	merely	that	these	epistemic	grounds	form	a	highly	
restricted	class;	only	a	few	select	grounds	will	get	in.	Any	first-person	
judgment	formed	in	any	way	other	than	by	them	will	be	vulnerable to	
error	 through	misidentification	 (VEM)	 relative	 to	 a	 use	 of	 the	 first-
person	concept.
What	is	the	significance	of	claiming	that	a	given	epistemic	source	
or	grounds	(I	use	these	terms	interchangeably)	is	a	member	of	this	re-
stricted	group?	The	immunity	isn’t	particularly	valuable	in	itself	—	we’re	
hardly	especially	anxious	about	making	mistakes	of	just	this	kind.	The	
significance,	rather,	is	that	the	immunity	tells	us	something	about the 
way in which first-person judgments are formed	on	those	grounds.	If	there	
is	 no	 possibility	 of	 error	 through	misidentification	 relative	 to	 a	 use	
of	the	first-person	concept,	that	is	because	the	judgment’s	formation,	
including	 its	 presuppositional	 background,	 did	 not	 involve	 an	 iden-
tity	between	oneself	 thought	of	first-personally	and	oneself	 thought	
of	 non-first-personally.	 After	 all,	 the	 presence	 of	 such	 an	 identifica-
tion	would	have	brought	with	it	the	possibility	of	a	misidentification.	
But	if	that’s	right,	then	it	must	mean	that	these	epistemic	sources	are	
such	that	they	directly sustain first-person thought —	the	deliverances	of	
introspection	 (and	 the	 rest)	are	 the	 special	 forms	of	 self-knowledge	
through	which	I	directly	encounter	myself	as	myself,	without	drawing	
on	any	additional	identificatory	information.
The	 term	 ‘immunity	 to	 error	 through	 misidentification’ is	 from	
Sydney	 Shoemaker’s	 ‘Self-Reference	 and	 Self-Awareness’	 (1969).	
There	 Shoemaker	 offered	 a	 category	 of	 IEM	 judgments	 now	 gener-
ally	thought	to	be	defunct:	 the	category	of	absolute IEM	judgments.7 
These	are	judgments,	grouped	by	their	predicative	content,	that	aren’t	
IEM	relative	only	 to	a	given	 set	of	 circumstances	 in	which	 they	are	
Recanati (2012), Salje (2017); of  episodic memory, see Shoemaker (1969), Evans (1982), 
Coliva (2006), Pryor (1999), Bermúdez (2013), Fernández (2014), Shoemaker (1970); of  
agent’s awareness, see O’Brien (2007); of  self-location, see Evans (1982), Cassam (1997), 
Pryor (1999), Hamilton (2009), Peacocke (2014). 
7.	 p. 564
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between	 two	kinds	of	 absolutely	VEM	 judgments:	 those	 that	 fall	 in	
the	category	as	a	matter	of	 contingent	 fact	 (de facto	 absolutely	VEM 
judgments),	and	those	that	fall	in	it	as	a	matter	of	conceptual	necessity	
(de jure absolutely	VEM	judgments).	
I have brown eyes	 is	an	example	of	a	de facto	absolutely	VEM	judg-
ment.	There	are	no	ways	of	properly	forming	this	judgment	through	
an	IEM	epistemic	source	as	things	are	for	thinkers	like	us	in	a	world	
like	this.	That’s	because	eye	colour	is	a	visible	property,	so,	given	how	
things	are	for	us,	we	can	find	out	about	it	only	either	by	seeing it	or	by	
being	told	about	 it	by	someone	else	who	has	seen	 it,	or	perhaps	by	
inferring	 it	 from	a	 reliably	 correlated	non-visible	property	—	all	 epis-
temic	 grounds	 that	 introduce	 the	 risk	 of	 an	 error	 through	misiden-
tification	 into	 the	final	 judgment.	But	 this	 is	 just	 an	accident	of	our	
physiology.	We	might	have	been	set	up	with	eye	colour	on	the	inside	
of	our	 retinas,	 in	such	a	way	 that	we	could	visually	access	our	own	
eye	colour	and	no	one	else’s	“from	the	inside”.	Or	we	could	have	been	
biologically	furnished	with	a	sort	of	fleshy	headset	involving	blinkers	
and	reflective	surfaces,	such	that	our	entire	visual	range	from	birth	to	
death	was	limited	to	gazing	into	our	own	eyes.	Or	perhaps	we	could	
have	 been	 equipped	 with	 an	 additional	 sense-modality,	 a	 form	 of	
electro-sensory	perception	that	delivers	a	constant	stream	of	detailed	
information	about	micro-changes	in	one’s	own	eye	colour	in	response	
to	light	variations	in	the	immediate	environment.	In	any	of	these	cases,	
we	would	have	had	what	Michael	Martin	and	others	have	called	a	sole- 
or	single-object faculty	for	knowing	about	eye	colour;	a	way	of	know-
ing	about	one’s	own	eye	colour	 that	 is	dedicated	 to	one’s	own	eyes	
and	no	one	else’s.8	Where	 there	 is	 single-object	dedication	 like	 this,	
there	is	IEM	relative	to	a	use	of	the	first-person	concept	—	these	would	
be	ways	of	 knowing	 about	one’s own	 eye	 colour,	 if	 it	were	 a	way	of	
knowing	about	anyone’s	eye	colour	at	all.	There	could	be	no	possibil-
ity	of	a	misidentification	error	on	the	basis	of	a	single-object	dedicated	
source	of	knowledge,	because	there	is	only	one	object	in	question.	So	
8.	 Martin (1995, 1997); see also Campbell (1999)
but	there	are	judgments	(categorised	by	predicative	content)	that	are	
always	VEM	relative	to	a	use	of	the	first-person	concept	in	all	circum-
stances.	Call	this	the	absolute VEM thesis. 
Why	think	the	absolute	VEM	thesis	is	true?	As	it	happens,	we’ve	al-
ready	met	the	answer.	That	is,	we	have	already	seen	that	being	an	IEM 
source	of	first-person	judgments	is	a	tightly	restricted	class	—	however	
the	ground-level	disagreements	are	resolved	in	the	final	tally,	it’s	clear	
that	 there	 aren’t	 very	 many	 candidate	 epistemic	 grounds	 that	 will	
make	it	 in;	 IEM	is	a	high	bar.	Now,	from	this	 it	 follows	that	there	is	
also	a	restriction	on	the	kinds	of	judgment	that	can	be	properly	formed	
on	the	basis	of	epistemic	grounds	falling	in	this	restricted	group.	That’s	
because	 there	 will	 be	 some	 judgments	 (categorised	 by	 predicative	
content)	that	aren’t	of	the	right	kind	to	be	properly	formable	in	this	
narrow	group	of	ways.	Those	judgments	will	be	VEM	relative	to	the	
first-person	concept	in	all	circumstances,	or	absolutely VEM.
Examples	will	help	to	make	the	point.	Take	the	judgments	I have 
brown eyes	and	I am prime minister.	Also,	suppose	for	the	sake	of	argu-
ment	that	all	the	candidate	IEM	epistemic	grounds	mentioned	above	
turn	out	to	be	sources	of	IEM	judgments	in	the	final	tally.	Even	so,	I	
will	never	be	able	to	properly	form	either	of	these	judgments	on	the	
basis	 of	 introspection,	 proprioception,	 action-awareness,	 perceptu-
al	 self-location	or	episodic	memory	alone.	These	 just	aren’t	ways	of	
knowing	about	eye	colour	or	positions	in	elected	office.	No	amount	
of	action-awareness	or	knowledge	of	 limb	position	will	put	me	 in	a	
position	to	know	what	colour	my	eyes	are	or	whether	my	party	won	
the	 election.	 To	 properly	 form	 judgments	 about	 my	 eye	 colour	 or	
elected	roles,	rather,	I	must	plausibly	turn	to	sources	on	the	VEM	side	
of	the	divide	—	mirror-involving	vision	or	testimony	for	the	first,	and	
presumably	some	process	involving	testimony	for	the	second.	If	that’s	
right,	then	there	are	some	judgments	that	fall	into	the	category	of	ab-
solute	VEM.
There	is	a	further	distinction	among	these	judgments	that	will	be	
useful	 for	our	purposes	—	and	that	will	also	help	to	show	why	 these	
two	 example	 judgments	 are	 absolutely	 VEM.	 The	 distinction	 is	
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as	a	matter	of	conceptual	necessity.	It	is	this	category	of	judgments	that	
will	be	of	primary	interest	in	the	rest	of	this	paper.	That’s	because	it	is	
these	properly	formed	judgments	that	will	be	systematically	unavail-
able	to	God	number	three.
§3. What God number three can’t properly believe
A	reminder	of	the	two	definitive	characteristics	of	God	number	three,	
repeated	from	above:
(i)	She	cannot	entertain	identities	of	the	form	⌜I = δ⌝;	and
(ii)	 she	 is	 otherwise	 omniscient	 and	 conceptually	
unlimited.
Notice	now	that	the	identity	mentioned	in	(i)	is	just	the	sort	of	identity	
involved	 in	 the	 proper	 formation	 of	 self-ascriptive	VEM	 judgments.	
(Recall,	 the	 significance	 of	 saying	 that	 a	 self-ascriptive	 judgment	 is	
IEM	relative	to	a	use	of	I	is	that	there	is	no	such	identity	involved	in	
the	judgment’s	formation;	conversely,	the	significance	of	saying	that	
a	self-ascriptive	judgment	is	VEM	relative	to	a	use	of	I	is	that	there	is 
such	an	identity	involved.	It	is	the	presence	of	this	identification	that	
explains	the	possibility	of	a	misidentification.)	Where	there	are	judg-
ments,	grouped	by	content,	that	can	be	formed	in	both	IEM	and	VEM 
ways	 (e.g.	my legs are crossed),	 the	deficiency	 in	 (i)	needn’t	pose	any	
problem	for	God	number	three	—	she	will	still	be	able	to	properly	form	
these	judgments;	it’s	just	that	she	will	have	to	stick	to	the	non-identi-
fication-involving	routes	to	get	there.	Trouble	for	God	number	three	
comes	when	 there	 are	 no	 IEM	 options.	 That’s	 to	 say,	 God	 number	
three	will	not	be	able	to	properly	form	any	absolutely	VEM	judgments.	
This	trouble	does	not	run	very	deep	for	self-ascriptive	judgments	
that	 are	merely	de facto	 absolutely	VEM,	 like	 I have brown eyes.	 This	
might	not	be	a	properly	formable	judgment	for	God	number	three	so	
long	as	she	is	otherwise	just	like	us,	but	we	don’t	need	to	change	very	
much	about	her	to	make	it	properly	available	to	her.	We	need	only	add	
to	the	case	that	God	number	three	differs	from	us	physiologically	in	
although	I have brown eyes is	absolutely	VEM	for	creatures	like	us	in	a	
world	like	this,	things	might	have	been	otherwise.
De jure	absolutely	VEM	judgments	are	not	like	this.	These	are	judg-
ments	that	don’t	have	their	VEM	property	contingently,	but	as	a	mat-
ter	of	 conceptual	necessity.	The	second	 judgment	above,	 I am prime 
minister,	 is	an	example	of	 this	kind.	 I	will	argue	for	this	claim	in	the	
next	section,	but	the	present	aim	is	to	introduce	the	category	of	de jure 
VEM	judgments	by	example	—	and	for	that,	it	is	enough	to	point	out	
the	starting	plausibility	of	the	idea	that	I	couldn’t	properly	judge	this	
to	be	true	of	myself	in	solipsistic	isolation,	by	focussing	hard	enough	
through	 appropriately	 trained	 introspection,	 or	 self-location,	 or	 pro-
prioception.	To	properly	judge	that	I am prime minister,	rather,	it’s	plau-
sible	that	I	must	see	myself	“from	the	outside”	as	others	do,	as	occu-
pying	 a	 certain	 role	 embedded	 in	 a	 social	 context.	Now,	 unlike	 the	
eye-colour	example	from	the	last	paragraph,	this	doesn’t	seem	like	an	
accident	of	our	physiology.	It’s	not	as	if	we	could	imagine	some	other	
way	we	might	have	been	built	that	would	make	it	easier	to	see	how	
introspection	could	be	a	suitable	way	of	grounding	 I am prime minis-
ter judgments,	or	that	could	provide	us	with	a	different	single-object	
dedicated	epistemic	faculty	that	would	have	done	the	job.	Whatever	
adjustments	we	might	imagine,	falling	under	the	concept	prime minis-
ter	will	always	involve	occupying	a	publicly	recognised	social	role,	and	
this	makes	it	natural	to	think	that	it	will	always	turn	out	that	proper	
formation	of	judgments	about	being	prime	minister	will	involve	epis-
temically	apprehending	oneself	as	others	do.	If	this	is	right	—	and	I	will	
argue	in	the	next	section	that	it	is	—	then	it	will	be	a	matter	of	concep-
tual	necessity	that	the	judgment	is	VEM.	It	will	be	de jure	absolutely	
VEM.	
We	now	have	before	us	 the	key	notion	of	de jure absolutely VEM 
judgments	relative	to	a	use	of	the	first-person	concept.9	These	are	first-
person	judgments	whose	proper	self-ascription	could	never	be	exclu-
sively	made	on	the	basis	of	a	single-object	dedicated	epistemic	source	
9.	 As with IEM, I will mostly drop (but always mean) the relativisation to a use of  the first-
person concept.
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judgments,	judgments	that	involve	the	self-ascription	of	a	social	kind	
predicate.	These	non-exhaustively	 include	self-ascriptions	of	gender	
(I am a woman),	religion	(I am Buddhist),	religious-cultural	groupings	(I 
am Jewish),	disability	status	(I am able-bodied),	professional	role	(I am a 
plumber),	societal	role	(I am a prisoner),	caste	(I am a Brahmin),	national-
ity	(I am French),	race	(I am Hispanic)	and	subcultural	groupings	(I am 
a hipster).	
The	 epistemology	 of	 social	 kind	 judgments	 is	 clearly	 varied	 and	
rarely	obvious.10	 Those	partly	 associated	with	perceptible	biological	
characteristics	 (e.g.	 race)	 will	 plausibly	 involve	 perceptual	 grounds.	
Some	(e.g.	gender)	will	surely	involve	introspection.	Others	(e.g.	na-
tionality,	professional	role)	don’t	seem	to	involve	perception	or	intro-
spection	at	all,	but	rather	seem	largely	dependent	on	direct	testimony.	
In	common	to	them	all,	however,	is	that	they	all	involve	the	ascription	
of	social	kind	predicates	—	and	this	means	that	their	proper	formation	
will	involve	both	knowing	about	a	certain	range	of	natural	(or,	more	
neutrally,	non-social)	properties,	and	a	proper	appreciation	of	 those	
properties	 as	 relevant	 to	 ascriptions	 of	 the	 appropriate	 social	 kind	
property.	Let’s	call	this	view	—	on	which	the	proper	ascription	of	social	
kind	predicates	involves	both	the	proper	recognition	of	the	instantia-
tion	of	non-social	properties,	and	proper	recognition	of	their	social	rel-
evance	—	the	two-component model	of	the	epistemology	of	social	kind	
judgments.
This	 two-component	 model	 forms	 a	 natural	 epistemic	 counter-
part	to	views	of	social	ontology	falling	under	what	we	might	call	the	
10. Despite growing recent discussion of  social ontology (cf. Epstein [2018] for a recent sur-
vey of  the social ontology literature) and an ongoing separate debate about the semantics 
of  social kind terms (descended from Burge 1979), it’s arguable that the epistemology 
of  social kinds has been somewhat left behind. Amie Thomasson stands as an exception 
to the under-discussion of  the epistemology of  social kinds, in her interest in the ques-
tion whether there could be gross error or ignorance throughout a community about the 
constitutive rules on social kinds (see Thomasson 2003). Another notable exception is 
Haslanger, who addresses the question whether we could be ignorant of  the rules making 
up our operative (as opposed to our more formally or explicitly defined manifest) social kind 
concepts (Haslanger 2005, Haslanger and Saul 2006). However, both of  these questions 
differ from questions of  the form ‘How do I know that this token entity is a five-pound 
note?’, which, as far as I can see, hasn’t yet been directly addressed in these literatures. 
one	of	the	ways	described	in	the	last	section,	such	that	she	has	a	sin-
gle-object	dedicated	way	of	forming	the	eye-colour	judgment	even	if	
we	don’t.	(In	her	world,	say,	eye	colour	is	on	the	other	side	of	the	retina	
and	visually	accessible	“from	the	inside”.)	So	as	yet,	there’s	no	reason	
to	suppose	that	these	sorts	of	judgments,	as	categorised	by	their	pred-
icative	 contents,	will	 be	 out	 of	 reach	 to	 a	 thinker	 like	God	number	
three,	even	if	there	are	some	ways	of	properly	forming	them	that	are.	
Real	 trouble	 for	God	number	 three	 comes	 in	 the	 form	of	de jure 
absolutely	VEM	judgments,	 judgments	 like	 I am prime minister.	 Judg-
ments	like	this	aren’t	just	typically	or	contingently	VEM	relative	to	a	
use	of	the	first-person	concept;	these	judgments	are	always	VEM	for	
all	 thinkers	 in	all	worlds.	As	a	 result,	no	matter	how	we	 invite	God	
number	three	to	reach	the	judgment,	or	what	physiological	tweaks	we	
imagine	on	her	behalf,	there	will	be	no	way	of	properly	forming	self-
ascriptive	judgments	in	this	category	that	don’t	involve	an	identity	of	
the	form	⌜I = δ⌝	—	an	identity	of	just	the	kind	that	she	is	ex hypothesi 
barred	from	entertaining.	So	properly	formed	de jure	absolutely	VEM 
judgments	 are	 out	 of	 range	 for	God	 number	 three.	 These	 are	 judg-
ments	that	can	be	properly	reached	only	in	an	identity-involving	way	
as	 a	 matter	 of	 conceptual	 necessity,	 and	 God	 number	 three	 is	 pre-
cluded	from	entertaining	identities	of	the	relevant	kind	as	a	matter	of	
stipulation.	
The	broad	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	raise	a	case	for	the	importance	of	
our	non-indexical	ways	of	 thinking	of	ourselves.	That	 there	 is	 a	 cat-
egory	 of	 properly	 formed	 self-ascriptive	 judgments	 that	 is	 available	
to	us	only	by	virtue	of	our	capacity	to	think	of	ourselves,	thought	of	
as	 ourselves,	 as	 identical	 to	 the	 referents	 of	 non-first-personal	 con-
cepts	already	largely	answers	that	aim.	It	turns	out	that	this	capacity	
is	what	funds	our	ability	to	properly	form	this	range	of	I am F	beliefs:	
I	 learn	I am that way	by	learning	of	the	person	who	is	 in	fact	myself,	
thought	of	in	a	way	that	someone	else	might	equally	use	to	think	of	me,	
that they are	that	way.	The	next	step,	however,	is	to	say	something	sub-
stantive	about	which	beliefs	fall	in	this	range.	I	suggest	that	an	impor-
tant	group	of	judgments	falling	into	it	are	self-ascriptive	social	identity	
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this	entity’s	non-social	properties:	its	colouring,	texture,	size,	surface-
reflectance	 properties	 and	 so	 on.	 (We	might	 imagine	 a	 scenario	 in	
which	I	have	all	my	exteroceptive	sensory	faculties	locked	exclusively	
onto	this	item	from	birth.13)	That	is	the	“yes”	part	of	the	answer,	and	it	
amounts	to	the	claim	that	the	knowledge	mentioned	in	(a)	could	be	
gained	in	a	single-object	dedicated	way.	
The	“no”	part	corresponds	to	the	knowledge	mentioned	in	(b).	 It	
amounts	 to	 the	 claim	 that	 no	 conceivable	 single-object	 dedicated	
channel	will	do	as	a	way	of	knowing	that	the	object	so	perceived	falls	
under	the	social	kind	five-pound note in	the	relevant	context.	This	is	a	
strong	claim,	but	one	that	we	have	good	reason	to	accept.	That’s	be-
cause	what	it	is	to	fall	under	a	social	kind	is	to	have	a	publicly recogni-
sable	status	as	having	what	it	takes	to	count	as	an	instance	of	the	kind.	
This	means	 that	 the	properties	 featuring	 in	our	 communally	 agreed	
rules	on	social	kinds	must	be	in-principle	publicly	accessible	proper-
ties.	And	 it	 is	 these	publicly	 accessible	properties	 that	 I	must	know	
a	given	worldly	entity	to	instantiate	before	I	can	know	it	to	be	an	in-
stance	of	that	kind.	If	this	is	right,	then	while	there	could	conceivably	
be	a	single-object	dedicated	way	of	knowing	about	some	of	 this	en-
tity’s	non-social	properties	(a),	there	is	no	possibility	of	a	single-object	
dedicated	way	of	knowing	that	entities	with	those	properties	count	as	
falling	under	a	certain	social	kind	category	(b).	Both	components	are	
needed	for	a	properly	formed	social	kind	judgment,	so	we	should	con-
clude	that	there	is	no	single-object	dedicated	way	of	properly	arriving	
at	the	judgment	this is a five-pound note.
There	are	two	premises	in	this	argument	in	need	of	support:	first,	
the	claim	that	the	properties	featuring	in	the	constitutive	rules	for	so-
cial	 kinds	must	 be	 in-principle	 publicly	 accessible;	 and	 second,	 the	
claim	that	 it	wouldn’t	suffice	for	knowledge	that	something	is	an	 in-
stance	of	a	social	kind	that	those	publicly	accessible	properties	are	ac-
cessed	 in	a	single-object	dedicated	way.	 I’ll	 take	each	 in	 turn	before	
13. It’s harder to know how I could have a single-object dedicated way of  knowing facts about 
its provenance — perhaps an exercise of  single-object dedicated abductive inference.
two-dimensional	model	of	social	kinds.11	Included	under	this	model	are	
any	views	on	which	 facts	about	 the	metaphysics	of	 social	kinds	are	
determined	by	a	 specification	of	certain	non-social	 facts	on	 the	one	
hand,	 and	 a	 specification	 of	 how	 those	 facts	 ground	 the	 associated	
facts	about	social	reality	on	the	other.	The	most	influential	two-dimen-
sional	model	of	social	ontology	comes	from	John	Searle	(1995,	2006,	
2010),	on	whose	view	non-social	facts	ground	social	facts	through	the	
collective imposition of status functions	of	the	form	x counts as y	relative	
to	given	contexts.	Under	the	corresponding	two-component	model	of	
the	epistemology	of	social	kind	judgments,	it’s	not	just	the	metaphys-
ics	of	the	domain	that	is	fundamentally	social.	To	properly	judge	a	so-
cial	kind	predicate	to	apply,	not	only	must	I	be	in	a	position	to	know	
that	the	object	has	a	certain	range	of	non-social	properties,	but	I	must	
also	be	in	a	position	to	properly	recognise	those	properties	as	relevant	
to	our	communally	determined	social	kind	categories.	If	this	is	right,	
then	there	is	something	deeply	social	about	the	proper	basis	for	apply-
ing	social	kind	predicates.	
What	exactly	does	this	mean	for	the	way	we	come	to	properly	apply	
social	kind	predicates	—	how	do	I	know	that	this	is	a	five-pound	note,	
this	 a	 Spaniard,	 this	 a	 woman?12	 According	 to	 the	 two-component	
model,	 I	must	 know	 (a)	 that	 this	 object	 has	 a	 certain	 range	of	 non-
social	properties,	and	(b)	that	objects	with	these	(non-social)	proper-
ties	count	as	five-pound	notes	in	a	UK	context	in	2018.	The	relevant	
question	for	our	purposes	now	is	whether	it	would	be	possible	to	gain	
knowledge	of	 this	 kind	 through	a	 single-object	dedicated	epistemic	
source.	
So,	 is	 it	 possible?	Well,	 yes	 and	 no.	What’s	 conceivable	 is	 that	 I	
could	have	a	single-object	dedicated	source	of	knowledge	of	many	of	
11. This use of  the term ‘two-dimensional model’ is from Brouwer (2018); at the intended 
level of  generality here, the model is intertranslatable between fact-talk and entity-talk. 
12. I frame the following discussion in terms friendly to Searle’s framework, as the currently 
dominant account in the literature, but analogues of  the argument to follow will apply to 
any two-dimensional account of  social ontology that appeals to communally established 
constitutive rules on social kinds, even where the agreement is less explicit than on Searle’s 
account (see Epstein 2013, p. 14, for a helpful survey of  options).
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long	as	the	properties	I	have	single-object	access	to	could	also	in	prin-
ciple	be	accessed	in	some	public	multiple-object	way?	
The	problem	here	is	a	classic	opacity	issue.	The	difference	between	
these	two	ways	of	apprehending	the	properties	impedes	direct	recog-
nition	that	the	publicly	accessible	properties	(a1…an) featuring	in	the	
relevant	 constitutive	 rule	 are	 the	 same	as	 the	properties	 (b1…bn)	 ap-
prehended	through	the	single-object	dedicated	epistemic	channel.	If	
I	can	access	this	range	of	properties	only	in	a	single-object	dedicated	
way,	but	they	feature	in	the	constitutive	rule	under	their	publicly	ac-
cessible	guise,	then	I	must	find	a	way	of	telling	that	a1=b1, a2=b2 and	so	
on,	before	 I	 can	rightly	be	said	 to	know	that	 this	object	has	what	 it	
takes	to	count	as	a	five-pound	note. No	problem	for	those	of	us	who	
have	both	ways	of	accessing	(and	so	comparing)	the	same	properties,	
but	this	would	be	much	more	of	a	problem	for	an	epistemic	agent	like	
God	number	three,	who	has	access	only	through	the	single-object	ded-
icated	route.	So,	to	know	that	this	is	a	five-pound	note,	not	only	must	
I	 have	 a	way	of	 telling	 that	 the	 item	 instantiates	 the	 relevant	 range	
of	properties,	but	I	must	know	it	in	a	way	that	facilitates	recognition	
that	 these	 are	 the	 very	 same	publicly	 accessible	 properties	 that	 fea-
ture	in	the	constitutive	rule	that	says	that	objects	with	properties	a1…
an count	as	five-pound	notes	in	a	UK	context	in	2018.	In	other	words,	I	
must	epistemically	apprehend	the	object’s	properties	in	the	very	same	
way	that	others	do.	If	this	is	right,	then	there	could	be	no	single-object	
dedicated	way	of	knowing	that	this is a five-pound note.	
Turn	now	to	social	kind	categories	that	apply	to	people,	like	woman, 
black or	Spaniard.	As	it	goes	for	five-pound	notes,	so	it	goes	for	genders,	
racial	categories	and	nationalities	too.	Again,	it’s	perfectly	conceivable	
that	we	could	have	had	single-object	dedicated	ways	of	properly	self-
ascribing	 certain	 (non-social)	 biological	 properties	 typically	 associ-
ated	with	these	social	kinds.	There	is	no	difficulty	in	conceiving	of	a	
physiologically	 tweaked	God	number	 three	who	has	an	IEM	way	of	
coming	to	properly	self-ascribe	a	skin	colour,	a	sex	organ	or	a	DNA 
profile.	But,	of	course,	to	properly	self-ascribe	a	skin	colour,	sex	organ	
or	DNA	profile	is	not	yet	to	properly	self-ascribe	social	kind	predicates	
turning	back	to	social	categories	more	pertinent	to	the	predicament	of	
God	number	three	than	the	example	of	a	five-pound	note.	
First,	the	claim	that	properties	featuring	in	the	constitutive	rules	for	
social	kinds	must	be	in-principle	publicly	accessible.	Earlier	(p.	12),	I	
implied	that	this	claim	follows	from	what	it	is	to	be	a	social	kind.	There	
are,	of	course,	a	good	many	ways	of	spelling	out	the	notion	of	a	social	
kind,	and	we	don’t	yet	seem	to	have	reached	a	clear	consensus	about	
how	best	 to	do	 it.14	Minimally,	however,	 social	kinds	are	 theoretical	
posits	 in	our	best	 theories	 in	 the	 relevant	domains,	posits	 that	earn	
their	keep	 (as	posits	do)	by	 their	explanatory	and	predictive	power.	
But,	for	a	social	kind	to	explain	and	predict	observable	social	phenom-
ena,	it	couldn’t	be	the	case	that	its	instances	are	in	principle	unrecog-
nisable	as	such	to	the	individuals	involved	in	the	explanatory-target	
phenomena.15	For	 instance,	 it	would	clearly	be	a	bad	 idea	 to	posit	a	
human-society	 currency	 whose	 constitutive	 condition	 included	 the	
property	 of	 being	 composed	 of	 1,638,278	 billion	 atoms.	 Individuals	
in	 that	 society	wouldn’t	be	able	 to	 recognise	whether	 they	had	any	
money	in	that	currency	or	not,	so	it	couldn’t	be	used	to	explain	or	pre-
dict	their	patterns	of	behaviour	at	an	appropriate	level	of	explanation.	
What	this	example	demonstrates	is	that	the	properties	that	feature	in	
the	constitutive	rules	for	social	kinds	are	plausibly	constrained	by	the	
condition	of	(in	principle)	public	accessibility.	
Next,	why	 couldn’t	 these	properties	also	 be	accessible	 through	a	
single-object	 dedicated	 faculty,	 and	why	 couldn’t	 such	 single-object	
access	be	enough	for	a	knowledgeable	ascription	of	the	associated	so-
cial	kind	predicate?	For	example,	why	isn’t	 it	enough	for	knowledge	
that	this	is	a	five-pound	note	to	use	information	coming	in	through	my	
locked-in	senses	that	it	has	all	the	right	properties	to	count	as	such,	so	
14. Cf. Epstein (2018), s.2
15. At least, in the majority of  cases. There could conceivably be derivative cases of  instances 
of  the kind whose relevant properties were not accessible to others, but only once the 
kind were established by paradigm instances in which the properties were publicly acces-
sible; hence the ‘in principle’ qualifier.
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cannot	entertain	identity	beliefs	of	the	very	kind	needed	to	form	VEM 
judgments?	I	have	argued	that	included	in	the	category	of	de jure ab-
solutely	VEM	judgments	are	self-ascriptive	social	identity	judgments.	
So,	 included	 in	 the	first-person	 judgments	 that	 systematically	 elude	
God	number	 three	are	 judgments	about	her	 social	 identity.	No	mat-
ter	what	counterfactual	interventions	we	try,	God	number	three	could	
never	properly	come	to	form	beliefs	about	her	own	gender,	race,	so-
cial	role,	profession	and	the	rest;	this	range	of	properly	formed	I am F 
beliefs	is	beyond	her	otherwise	omniscience.	This	is	no	small	lack	on	
her	part	—	these	are	self-ascriptive	beliefs	that	matter	to	us.	They	pick	
out	aspects	of	our	identity	that	make	us	“who	we	are”,	in	the	important	
non-philosophical	 sense	of	 that	phrase.	God	number	 three,	 then,	al-
ready	looks	to	be	deeply	debilitated,	and	in	answer	to	the	broad	ques-
tion	of	this	paper,	the	importance	of	our	conceptual	capacity	to	think	
of	ourselves	as	ourselves	under	non-indexical	concepts	must	already	
be	correspondingly	promoted	in	its	significance.	
That	concludes	the	first	argumentative	step	of	the	paper.	In	the	next	
section,	I	argue	that	there	are	further	ramifications	for	what	God	num-
ber	three	can’t	do.
§4. What God number three can’t do
The	stated	aim	of	 this	paper	was	 to	 identify	 the	advantage	we	have	
over	God	number	three	as agents.	The	debility	mentioned	at	the	end	
of	the	last	section	doesn’t	yet	give	us	an	answer	to	that	question,	be-
cause	 it	 tells	 us	 only	 what	 self-ascriptive	 beliefs	 she	 can’t	 properly	
form,	not	what	she	can’t	do	as	an	agent.	But	it	gets	us	most	of	the	way	
there.	That’s	because	 the	answer	 is	going	 to	be	 that	 the	domains	of	
agency	that	God	number	three	is	systematically	excluded	from	are	(at	
least)	those	whose	explanation	involves	essential	mention	of	properly	
formed	self-ascriptive	social	identity	beliefs	on	her	part.	
How	exactly	should	this	proposal	be	fleshed	out?	 I’ll	start	with	a	
simple	suggestion,	which	I	only	mention	to	put	to	one	side:	the	actions	
that	God	number	three	is	precluded	from	intentionally	performing	in-
clude	all	 those	that	would	have	been	motivated	by	properly	 formed	
of	race,	gender	or	nationality.	 In	different	settings,	 the	same	skin	co-
lour	 is	racialized	in	different	ways,	 the	truth	of	gender	claims	varies	
independently	of	 the	 truth	of	 claims	about	 sex	organs,	 and	 there	 is	
a	vanishingly	low	correlation	between	DNA	profiles	and	nationality.	
Rather,	to	know	that	this	is	a	woman,	this	person	is	black	or	this	is	a	
Spaniard	is	to	know	that	the	individual	has	the	cluster	of	in-principle	
publicly	accessible	properties	that	feature	in	a	communally	imposed	
status	 function	 for	 those	 social	 categories	 in	 the	 local	 context	 (e.g.	
people	with	properties	a1…an count	as	black	in	a	UK	context	in	2018).
16 
Now,	the	moral	of	the	last	few	paragraphs	is	that	for	token	social	kind	
ascriptions	to	count	as	well-grounded,	I	must	be	in	a	position	to	recog-
nise	the	individual’s	properties	as	being	the	very	same	ones	as	those	
featuring	in	this	constitutive	rule	on	the	social	kind,	without	running	
into	opacity	issues.	This	means	that	to	properly	ascribe	these	catego-
ries,	I	must	apprehend	the	individual’s	relevant	properties,	a1…an ,	in	
the	same	way	that	others	do.	That	is	the	case	even	when	the	target	of	
the	ascription	is	myself.	
The	upshot	of	this	argument	is	that	it	is	built	in	to	social	kind	con-
cepts	 that	 they	 cannot	 be	 properly	 ascribed	 in	 a	 single-object	 dedi-
cated	way.	It	is	part	of	the	nature	of	these	concepts	that	their	proper	
application	depends	on	an	awareness	of	 the	object’s	properties	 that	
feature	 in	 the	 relevant	 communal	 beliefs	 and	 attitudes.	 Insofar	 as	 I	
know	 about	 certain	 properties	 of	mine	 only	 in	 a	 single-object	 dedi-
cated	way,	I	cannot	be	in	a	position	to	recognise	them	as	the	properties	
that	others	are	responding	to	in	their	ascriptions	of	the	social	kind.	It	is	
only	insofar	as	I	know	about	my	own	properties	in	the	same	way	that	
others	do	 that	 I	am	justified	 in	 treating	 these	as	 the	very	properties	
that	feature	in	the	relevant	collective	status	function	imposition.	Social	
kind	self-ascriptions	are	de jure absolutely	VEM	relative	to	uses	of	the	
first-person	concept.	
This	 brings	us	back	 to	 the	 central	 question	of	 this	 section:	what	
can’t	God	number	 three	properly	believe	—	God	number	 three,	who	
16. This proposal is neutral on what these properties are; I don’t rule out that they could 
include such self-determined properties as public avowals.
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God	number	three’s	ill-formed	social	identity	beliefs.	Even	if	she	can	
improperly	form	one-off	beliefs	about	her	social	 identity,	they	won’t	
be	stable	enough	to	sustain	reliable	and	coherent	patterns	of	action	
over	time.
Why	are	properly	formed	(or,	equivalently,	well-grounded	or	epis-
temically	 justified)	 beliefs	 better	 suited	 to	 sustaining	 reliable	 and	
coherent	patterns	of	 action	over	 time	 than	 their	 improperly	 formed	
counterparts?	This	is	really	a	new	guise	for	the	old	question	of	what	
justification	adds	to	mere	true	belief.	And	the	answer	I	am	drawing	on	
here	is	likewise	an	old	one:
So	 long	as	 they	stay	with	us,	 true	beliefs	are	a	fine	pos-
session,	and	effect	all	that	is	good;	but	they	do	not	care	
to	stay	for	long,	and	run	away	out	of	the	human	soul,	and	
thus	are	of	no	great	value	until	one	 ties	 them	down	by	
working	out	the	cause.	(Meno	97e–98a)
Improperly	formed	beliefs	are	unstable	beliefs,	whereas	proper	forma-
tion	makes	 for	 stability	over	 time.	And	 it	 is	only	 stable	beliefs	over	
time	that	can	reliably	motivate	coherent	patterns	of	action	over	time.	
I	say	that	the	explanation	of	reliable	and	coherent	patterns	of	inten-
tional	action	over	 time	 requires	 that	 the	motivating	beliefs	are	well-
grounded.	I	don’t	say	it	requires	their	truth.	A	well-grounded	pattern	
of	false	beliefs	can	enter	into	the	explanation	of	a	reliable	and	coher-
ent	pattern	of	intentional	action	just	as	effectively	as	a	well-grounded	
pattern	of	true	ones.	An	individual	who	is	misinformed	early	on	about	
their	birth	date	will	reliably	and	coherently	intentionally	act	in	ways	
made	appropriate	by	their	properly	formed	beliefs	about	how	old	they	
are,	despite	the	falsity	of	those	beliefs.	An	individual	who	internalises	
a	misascribed	 gender	 category	 as	 a	 child	will	 be	 reliably	motivated	
to	act	coherently	 in	ways	made	appropriate	by	 those	gender	beliefs,	
despite	 those	beliefs	being	 false.	The	key	notion	 for	 the	production	
of	reliable	and	coherent	patterns	of	intentional	action	over	time	is	not	
truth	but	well-groundedness.
self-ascriptive	 social	 identity	 beliefs.	 For	 example,	 given	 that	 God	
number	three	can’t	properly	self-ascribe	a	gender	predicate,	it	will	be	
beyond	her	to	intentionally	tick	the	box	marked	“W”	on	a	passport	ap-
plication.	The	“domains	of	agency”	that	God	number	three	is	excluded	
from	on	this	simple	suggestion	are	(at	least)	made	up	of	all	the	indi-
vidual	actions	like	this	that	her	doxastic	debility	from	the	last	section	
prevents	her	from	intentionally	performing.	
The	 problem	 with	 the	 simple	 suggestion	 is	 that	 an	 improperly	
formed	belief	can	explain	intentional	action	just	as	well	as	a	properly	
formed	one.	If	I	take	hallucinogenic	drugs	that	cause	me	to	form	the	
belief	that	an	angry	pink	elephant	is	stalking	me	with	a	hunting	knife,	
this	 improperly	 formed	 belief	 will	 obviously	 feature	 in	 a	 personal-
level	 explanation	of	why	 I’m	 currently	hiding	under	 the	 table.	 Like-
wise,	 even	 if	God	number	 three’s	 stipulated	 limitation	prevents	 her	
from	properly	forming	self-ascriptive	beliefs	about	her	social	identity,	
there’s	nothing	to	stop	her	forming	them	improperly	(by	gut	feeling,	
for	instance,	or	by	use	of	psychoactive	drugs)	and	then	intentionally	
acting	by	 their	 lights	—	forming	 the	spontaneous	belief	 that	 she	 is	a	
woman	and	intentionally	ticking	the	box,	for	instance.	Their	improper	
formation	 would	 make	 these	 beliefs	 ill-grounded,	 but	 ill-grounded-
ness	doesn’t	obviously	undermine	explanatory	 force	with	respect	 to	
intentional	actions	performed	on	their	basis.	
A	better	suggestion	is	one	that	shifts	from	thinking	about	God	num-
ber	three’s	capacity	for	individual	intentional	action	performances	to	
her	capacity	to	produce	reliable	and	coherent patterns of	agency over	
time.	That’s	because	even	if	one-off	intentional	action	performances	
can	be	adequately	explained	by	appeal	to	God	number	three’s	improp-
erly	formed	beliefs	about	her	social	identity,	it’s	not	true	that	reliable	
and	 coherent	 patterns	 of	 action	 can	 be	 likewise	 explained.	 My	 ill-
formed	pink-elephant	belief	might	enter	centrally	 into	a	good	expla-
nation	of	why	I	am	intentionally	acting	as	I	am	at	the	moment,	but	its	
ill-groundedness	makes	it	unstable;	as	soon	as	I	sober	up,	I’ll	come	out	
from	under	the	table.	Such	drug-induced	beliefs	are	too	fickle	to	moti-
vate	reliable	and	coherent	patterns	of	action	over	time.	Likewise	with	
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Even	 if	 the	 essential	 non-indexical	 thesis	 doesn’t	 contradict	 the	
essential	indexical	thesis,	it	does	stand	counter	to	another	influential	
philosophical	 tradition.	There	have	been	many	articulations,	by	phi-
losophers	of	different	traditions,	of	the	idea	that	apprehending	oneself	
as oneself	 is	 in	 some	 sense	 incompatible	with	 apprehending	oneself	
as an object —	indeed,	 for	Schopenhauer,	 this	 is	 “the	most	monstrous	
contradiction	ever	 thought	of”.17	 If	 the	essential	non-indexical	 thesis	
is	true,	then	not	only	is	it	possible	to	think	of	oneself	as	oneself	as	an	
object,	but	our	capacity	to	think	of	ourselves	this	way	is	indispensable	
to	 our	 capacity	 to	 participate	 fully	 in	 some	of	 the	most	 value-laden	
domains	of	intentional	activity.18 
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We	are	now	 in	 a	position	 to	 give	 the	paper’s	 proposal	 in	 full.	 In	
§§2–3	 I	 argued	 that	God	 number	 three’s	 stipulated	 limitation	 in	 (i)	
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§5. Conclusion
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